

Detection of Breeding Blankets Using Antineutrinos

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Arlington, Virginia



30-Second Preview

1. Need for monitoring **plutonium disposition**
2. Connection between **fast reactors**, breeding blankets, and antineutrinos
3. Approach for **detecting a breeding blanket using antineutrinos**
4. Results demonstrating **proof of principle**
5. Next steps needed for **proof of usefulness**

Nuclear Arms Control


World Stockpiles of Fissile Materials

~~1380~~
1345

tons of highly-enriched uranium

~~495~~
499

tons of separated plutonium



each block = 50 kg of HEU,
the amount necessary to make
a first-generation fission bomb;
27,600 bombs-worth total

each block = 5 kg of Pu,
the amount necessary to make
a first-generation fission bomb;
99,000 bombs-worth total

Graphic by Alex Wellerstein, nuclearsecrecy.com

Plutonium Material Disposition Agreement


U.S.-Russia agreement

Each dispose of 34 MT of Pu-239
declared excess to military use

U.S. disposition - MOX burning in LWRs



Image: NTI 2010



PMDA Article III.3

2010 Amended Protocol:

Russia decides to burn excess plutonium in fast reactors

“The radial blanket of the BN-600 reactor will be completely removed before disposition of conversion product begins in it, and the BN-800 will be operated with a breeding ratio of less than one for the entire term of this Agreement.”

PMDA Article III.3


Trust, but verify.

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Fast Breeder Reactors

Goal for the PMDA is to monitor the blanket signal

Image: Glaser et. al, Science & Global Security 15 (2007)



Fast neutrons drive core fission and neutron capture in a surrounding blanket of NU or DU where Pu-239 breeding occurs

Reactor Electron Antineutrinos

Goal for the PMDA is to monitor the blanket signal






Image: A. Bernstein ANS 2013 Talk

6 emitted per fission from
beta decay of U and Pu
fission fragments, energy
range up to **12 MeV**



2 emitted per capture from fast neutrons on U,
energy up to **1.26 MeV**

Coherent Antineutrino Detection



Coherent elastic neutrino-nucleus scattering (CENNS)

Threshold-less reaction

Cross section $\sigma_{\nu A} \sim 10^{-39} \text{ cm}^2$

Small nuclear recoils - few eV to keV

$$\frac{d\sigma}{dT}(E_\nu) = \frac{G_F^2}{4\pi} N^2 M_N \left(1 - \frac{M_N T}{2E_\nu^2} \right), \quad T_{max} = \frac{E_\nu}{1 + \frac{M_N}{2E_\nu}}$$

Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor



Image: Mitra Talk (BHAVINI)

Fast reactor being built in India

Full 3-D simulation

**Look at fresh blanket signal
during first 90 days**

**Model and data
taken from:
A. Glaser and M. V.
Ramana, Science &
Global Security 15
(2007)**

Safeguards on Future Indian Fast Reactors

3 Phase Agenda...

Phase 2: Pu-239 breeders

Phase 3: U-233 breeders

Safeguards...

PFBR – No.

Future commercial fast reactors – Yes.

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)...

Ban production of FM for weapons

Strictly monitor civilian FM production

Reactor Top View




Image: Mitra Talk (BHAVINI)

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


Image: Mitra Talk (BHAVINI)

Analysis: **Set-up** and **Statistics**

- ▶ Assume **perfect detection efficiency**
- ▶ Use **surface deployment 25 m** from core
- ▶ Examine **various target materials** to gauge rate vs. threshold tension
- ▶ Use **standard chi-squared** analysis
- ▶ Assume **flat background** distribution
- ▶ Leave **reactor power free** in fit


NEW Preliminary Results

Raw detected event rates


Material	Core Fission	Core Capture	Blanket Fission	Blanket Capture	Max Recoil [eV]
^2H	7,943	183	733	188	1,675
^4He	15,886	367	1,466	376	838
^{28}Si	111,205	2,569	10,259	2,634	120

100 kg detector at 25 m stand off for 90 days


Contribution to Total Antineutrino Flux



NEW Raw Event Rates for 10 kg of ^{28}Si



NEW $\Delta\chi^2$ Sensitivity Analysis



Achieved: Proof of Principle

- ▶ On-going R&D on silicon-based charge coupled devices (CCDs) shows detector masses of 17-kg with 20 eV threshold may be possible in the near future¹
- ▶ Can detect the presence of a breeding blanket at a PFBR-type fast reactor at 95% confidence level within 90 days using a 36-kg ²⁸Si CENNS detector with a threshold of 30 eV²

¹G. Fernandez Moroni, J. Estrada, E. E. Paolini, et al., Phys. Rev. D 91, 072001 (2015); ² Cogswell and Huber INMM Proceedings 2015

NEXT STEPS: Proof of Usefulness

Can CENNS or a combination of CENNS+IBD data help estimate...

Pu-239 mass in the blanket

Grade of Pu-239 being burned in the core

Grade of Pu-239 bred in the blanket

SIMULATION




Image: Kutt et. al, SGS 22 (2014)

DEMONSTRATION



Image: World Nuclear News 2015

APPLICATION

2000 Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement as amended by the 2010 Protocol

AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
CONCERNING THE MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION
OF PLUTONIUM DESIGNATED AS NO LONGER REQUIRED
FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES AND RELATED COOPERATION

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Guided by:

The Joint Statement of Principles for Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes, signed by the President of the United States of America and the President of the Russian Federation on September 2, 1998, affirming the intention of each country to remove by stages approximately 50 metric tons of plutonium from their nuclear weapons programs and to convert this plutonium into forms unusable for nuclear weapons;

Image: 2010 PMDA Protocol

Thank You!




Image: Super Kamiokande website

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